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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000983

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [KDEM](#) [MR](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: UAE MFA VIEW ON MAURITANIA

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REF: STATE 91116

[11](#). (C) Post delivered reftel points on Mauritania via diplomatic note, reinforced in an August 27 conversation with Assistant Under Secretary for Political Affairs Tariq al-Haidan. The senior diplomat on duty, al-Haidan told the Charge and A/DCM that MFA had been visited by the Mauritanian Ambassador two days prior, apparently with a request that the UAEG welcome an envoy from Nouakchott to discuss the ongoing situation. MFA has not responded to that request (in the absence of the Minister and Minister of State), and al-Haidan said the UAEG would urge a return to normalcy.

[12](#). (C) Al-Haidan lamented the discord in Nouakchott yet said the UAEG had few options but to engage with those in power. Acknowledging the optimum situation of power residing with democratically-elected President Abdallahi, al-Haidan said that Abdallahi had complicated his own position by dismissing his antagonists too quickly and reinstating a prime minister that the military opposed. A more gradual process of change would have been much more prudent, he stressed. The president had thus placed himself in an awkward position, lamented al-Haidan (contrasting Abdallahi's haste with the more methodical consolidation of power by Algerian President Bouteflika).

[13](#). (C) Comment: While sympathetic to the need for calm in Nouakchott, the UAEG is unlikely to come out with strong statements one way or another on the leadership equation and will likely refer to deliberations in the Arab League and GCC as it considers the way forward. End comment.

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